Meta Transactions
| This document is better viewed at https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/api/metatx |
This directory includes contracts for adding meta-transaction capabilities (i.e. abstracting the execution context from the transaction origin) following the ERC-2771 specification.
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ERC2771Context: Provides a mechanism to override the sender and calldata of the execution context (msg.senderandmsg.data) with a custom value specified by a trusted forwarder. -
ERC2771Forwarder: A production-ready forwarder that relays operation requests signed off-chain by an EOA.
Core
ERC2771Context
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/metatx/ERC2771Context.sol";Context variant with ERC2771 support.
Avoid using this pattern in contracts that rely in a specific calldata length as they’ll
be affected by any forwarder whose msg.data is suffixed with the from address according to the ERC2771
specification adding the address size in bytes (20) to the calldata size. An example of an unexpected
behavior could be an unintended fallback (or another function) invocation while trying to invoke the receive
function only accessible if msg.data.length == 0.
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The usage of delegatecall in this contract is dangerous and may result in context corruption.
Any forwarded request to this contract triggering a delegatecall to itself will result in an invalid _msgSender
recovery.
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isTrustedForwarder(address forwarder) → bool public
Indicates whether any particular address is the trusted forwarder.
_msgSender() → address internal
Override for msg.sender. Defaults to the original msg.sender whenever
a call is not performed by the trusted forwarder or the calldata length is less than
20 bytes (an address length).
Utils
ERC2771Forwarder
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/metatx/ERC2771Forwarder.sol";A forwarder compatible with ERC2771 contracts. See ERC2771Context.
This forwarder operates on forward requests that include:
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from: An address to operate on behalf of. It is required to be equal to the request signer. -
to: The address that should be called. -
value: The amount of native token to attach with the requested call. -
gas: The amount of gas limit that will be forwarded with the requested call. -
nonce: A unique transaction ordering identifier to avoid replayability and request invalidation. -
deadline: A timestamp after which the request is not executable anymore. -
data: Encodedmsg.datato send with the requested call.
Relayers are able to submit batches if they are processing a high volume of requests. With high throughput, relayers may run into limitations of the chain such as limits on the number of transactions in the mempool. In these cases the recommendation is to distribute the load among multiple accounts.
Batching requests includes an optional refund for unused msg.value that is achieved by
performing a call with empty calldata. While this is within the bounds of ERC-2771 compliance,
if the refund receiver happens to consider the forwarder a trusted forwarder, it MUST properly
handle msg.data.length == 0. ERC2771Context in OpenZeppelin Contracts versions prior to 4.9.3
do not handle this properly.
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Security Considerations
If a relayer submits a forward request, it should be willing to pay up to 100% of the gas amount specified in the request. This contract does not implement any kind of retribution for this gas, and it is assumed that there is an out of band incentive for relayers to pay for execution on behalf of signers. Often, the relayer is operated by a project that will consider it a user acquisition cost.
By offering to pay for gas, relayers are at risk of having that gas used by an attacker toward
some other purpose that is not aligned with the expected out of band incentives. If you operate a
relayer, consider whitelisting target contracts and function selectors. When relaying ERC-721 or
ERC-1155 transfers specifically, consider rejecting the use of the data field, since it can be
used to execute arbitrary code.
constructor(string name) public
See EIP712.constructor.
verify(struct ERC2771Forwarder.ForwardRequestData request) → bool public
Returns true if a request is valid for a provided signature at the current block timestamp.
A transaction is considered valid when the target trusts this forwarder, the request hasn’t expired
(deadline is not met), and the signer matches the from parameter of the signed request.
A request may return false here but it won’t cause executeBatch to revert if a refund
receiver is provided.
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execute(struct ERC2771Forwarder.ForwardRequestData request) public
Executes a request on behalf of `signature’s signer using the ERC-2771 protocol. The gas
provided to the requested call may not be exactly the amount requested, but the call will not run
out of gas. Will revert if the request is invalid or the call reverts, in this case the nonce is not consumed.
Requirements:
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The request value should be equal to the provided
msg.value. -
The request should be valid according to
verify.
executeBatch(struct ERC2771Forwarder.ForwardRequestData[] requests, address payable refundReceiver) public
Batch version of execute with optional refunding and atomic execution.
In case a batch contains at least one invalid request (see verify), the
request will be skipped and the refundReceiver parameter will receive back the
unused requested value at the end of the execution. This is done to prevent reverting
the entire batch when a request is invalid or has already been submitted.
If the refundReceiver is the address(0), this function will revert when at least
one of the requests was not valid instead of skipping it. This could be useful if
a batch is required to get executed atomically (at least at the top-level). For example,
refunding (and thus atomicity) can be opt-out if the relayer is using a service that avoids
including reverted transactions.
Requirements:
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The sum of the requests' values should be equal to the provided
msg.value. -
All of the requests should be valid (see
verify) whenrefundReceiveris the zero address.
Setting a zero refundReceiver guarantees an all-or-nothing requests execution only for
the first-level forwarded calls. In case a forwarded request calls to a contract with another
subcall, the second-level call may revert without the top-level call reverting.
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_validate(struct ERC2771Forwarder.ForwardRequestData request) → bool isTrustedForwarder, bool active, bool signerMatch, address signer internal
Validates if the provided request can be executed at current block timestamp with
the given request.signature on behalf of request.signer.
_recoverForwardRequestSigner(struct ERC2771Forwarder.ForwardRequestData request) → bool, address internal
Returns a tuple with the recovered the signer of an EIP712 forward request message hash and a boolean indicating if the signature is valid.
The signature is considered valid if ECDSA.tryRecover indicates no recover error for it.
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_execute(struct ERC2771Forwarder.ForwardRequestData request, bool requireValidRequest) → bool success internal
Validates and executes a signed request returning the request call success value.
Internal function without msg.value validation.
Requirements:
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The caller must have provided enough gas to forward with the call.
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The request must be valid (see
verify) if therequireValidRequestis true.
Emits an ExecutedForwardRequest event.
Using this function doesn’t check that all the msg.value was sent, potentially
leaving value stuck in the contract.
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ExecutedForwardRequest(address indexed signer, uint256 nonce, bool success) event
Emitted when a ForwardRequest is executed.
| An unsuccessful forward request could be due to an invalid signature, an expired deadline, or simply a revert in the requested call. The contract guarantees that the relayer is not able to force the requested call to run out of gas. |
ERC2771ForwarderInvalidSigner(address signer, address from) error
The request from doesn’t match with the recovered signer.